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Abstract This paper considers three questions concern-
ing a low-carbon society. The first is the implication of a
50% reduction in greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2050. In the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report, released in 2007 (IPCC 2007b;
http://www.gtp89.dial.pipex.com/chpt.htm), the suggested
limit of increase in average worldwide temperatures is
2–3C above the current level, but is this consistent with a
50% reduction by 2050? Second, when a 50% reduction in
global emissions is envisioned, what is the level of
reduction needed in Japan? Should the 50% reduction be
uniform for advanced industrial countries and developing
countries, or differentiated based on a country’s emissions?
Third, how feasible are emission reduction targets in
Japan? Even if the emission reduction target set for each
country takes into account climate change impact and
equity, whether the target is technically, or socially and
economically, acceptable is another matter.
Keywords Climate change  Long-term target 
Burden sharing  Low-carbon society  Innovation
The trend toward a low-carbon society
On 24 May 2007, Shinzo Abe (Prime Minister of Japan at
the time) gave a dinner speech at the International Con-
ference on the Future of Asia entitled ‘‘Invitation to ‘Cool
Earth 50’: Three Proposals, Three Principles.’’ The speech
proposed (1) a long-term target of cutting global emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to half the current level by
2050 as a common goal for the entire world, (2) three
principles for establishing an international framework to
address global warming from 2013 onwards, and (3) the
launching of a national campaign for achieving the Kyoto
Protocol target. In particular, the first proposal for cutting
GHG emissions by half included the specific suggestions of
developing innovative technologies and building a low-
carbon society. Furthermore, at the G8 Summit held in
early June 2007 in Heiligendamm, Germany, there was
agreement among leaders to give serious consideration to
reductions of at least 50% by the year 2050.
In Japan, interest in a low-carbon society is growing
rapidly. However, this is not merely a recent trend. Various
European countries have been considering drastic reduc-
tions in their own emissions since about 2000. This has
resulted in the release of an energy white paper in the
United Kingdom (February 2003) and a report by the
research agency of the German government, the German
Advisory Council on Global Change (October 2003). Nor
has this movement been limited to the national level. In
June 2005, the state of California in the United States
announced a target of an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions
by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Moreover, the
movement to give these targets legal binding force has
grown stronger.
This paper considers three questions that arise from
these trends pertaining to a low-carbon society. The first is
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the implication of a 50% reduction by 2050. In the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report, released in 2007 (IPCC 2007b), the
suggested limit of increase in average worldwide temper-
atures is 2–3C above the current level. But is this
suggestion consistent with a 50% reduction by 2050? The
second question addressed is, if a 50% reduction of global
emissions is envisioned, what is the level of reduction
needed in Japan? Should the 50% reduction be uniform for
advanced industrial countries and developing countries, or
differentiated based on a country’s historical or per capita
emissions, carbon intensity or other indexes? Third, how
feasible are the emission reduction targets in Japan? Even
if the emission reduction target set for each country takes
into account climate change impact and equity, whether the
target is within the range of what is technically, or socially
and economically, acceptable is another matter.
Model and calculation of the impact on climate change
with a 50% reduction in GHG emissions
To evaluate the mitigating effect on climate change
brought about by a 50% reduction in worldwide GHG
emissions, this paper uses the AIM/Impact (Policy) model
(Hijioka et al. 2005). This model combines GHGs and
climate change mechanisms with one regional world
macroeconomic model and an energy supply and con-
sumption model, calculating a number of variables so as to
maximize the present value of economic welfare. However,
Hijioka et al. (2005) take into account only a portion of
carbon cycle feedback, so this paper adds the following
improvement. First of all, in the AIM/Impact (Policy)





EðsÞGðt  sÞds ð1Þ
Here, DM(t) is the change in atmospheric carbon storage
in the period t years since the base year (1850), E(t) is
carbon dioxide emissions, and G(t) is the impulse response
function estimated by Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann
(1987). This formulation was established through
experiments with oceanic general circulation models and,
although it can reflect the increase in the ocean’s
absorption of CO2 that occurs with increases in
atmospheric CO2, it cannot reflect the fertilization effect
of CO2 on terrestrial vegetation, or the feedback effects of
climate change. Friedlingstein et al. (2003) have proposed
the following formula (Eq. 2) as a comprehensive




DFLðtÞ ¼ bLDMðtÞ þ cLDTðtÞ
DFOðtÞ ¼ bODMðtÞ þ cODTðtÞ
ð2Þ
Here, DFL(t) and DFO(t) are changes in land or ocean
storage of CO2, respectively, bL and bO are land or ocean
carbon sensitivity to atmospheric CO2, cL and cO are land
or ocean carbon sensitivity to climate change, and DT(t) is
temperature increase. Utilizing this method of estimation,
G(t) in Eq. 1 roughly indicates ocean carbon feedback
caused by atmospheric CO2 increase. Therefore, combining
the feedback mechanism expressed by Eq. 2 with Eq. 1









The values for bL and cL + cO are taken from experiments
using coupled carbon cycle climate model intercomparison
project (C4MIP) models (IPCC 2007a). Accordingly, bL is in
the range of 0.1–1.2 (GtC  GtC-1), while the median is 0.6
(GtC  GtC-1). In addition, cL + cO is in the range of -199
to -36 (GtC  C-1), while the median is -96 (GtC C-1).
Figure 1 shows the impact on climate change that will occur
with a 50% reduction in CO2 by 2050, with the median value
bL = 0.6 GtC  GtC-1 and cL + cO = -96 GtC  C-1 as
the reference value for carbon feedback, and 3C, the best
estimate value (IPCC 2007a), as the reference value for
equilibrium climate sensitivity. The gases to be reduced are
the six gases specified in the Kyoto Protocol and, if 1990 is
taken as the baseline year for calculating emissions, the rise
in temperature by 2050 will be roughly 2.0C compared to
pre-industrial times (case 2 in Fig. 1). Although this is
considerably lower than the 2.7C of BaU (business as
usual), it nevertheless constitutes continued warming. In this
calculation, the reductions from BaU begin in 2010, but their
effect on limiting temperature does not occur until around
2025. Figure 1 shows the changes only up to 2100, but
Table 1 shows temperature increases over the longer term
(up to 2200). The table shows that, even with a 50% global
reduction in emissions by 2050, we must expect a rise in
temperature to about 3C by 2200 unless further reduction
efforts are made thereafter.
What should the emission reduction target be to achieve
the objective of climate change mitigation?
The previous section analyzed the effect of a 50% reduc-
tion in emissions by 2050 on controlling increases in
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temperature. At the same time, the IPCC Fourth Assess-
ment Report (IPCC 2007b) states: ‘‘It is very likely that all
regions will experience either declines in net benefits or
increases in net costs for increases in temperature greater
than about 2–3C,’’ taking 2–3C above 1990 levels as the
upper limit of temperature increase in terms of impact. So
what is the upper limit for emissions when viewed in terms
of this target? This problem is accompanied by a number of
uncertainties.
The first is the relationship between emissions and
temperature increase. Stated simply, this relationship is as
follows. Firstly, (a) GHG emissions increase in concen-
tration in the atmosphere, and (b) these increased
concentrations cause radiative forcing. Radiative forcing
(c) then causes climate change. Furthermore, (d) climate
change exerts an impact on the generation, absorption, and
decomposition mechanisms of GHGs, thereby changing the
effects of (a) and (b). At each of these stages, uncertainties
arise. Of (a) through (d), the stages with the greatest
uncertainty are (c) and (d). This article considers the
implications of variations in climate sensitivity concerning
(c). With regard to (d), we will consider the implications of
uncertainties in the carbon feedback parameters of the
C4MIP experiments mentioned above.
As for the variability in equilibrium climate sensitivity,
Fig. 2 shows the probability of climate sensitivity suggested
by previous research (IPCC 2007a). Based on this informa-
tion, the IPCC contends that the sensitivities are likely to be
in the range of 2–4.5C higher, with a most likely value of
about 3C. Figure 2 shows that 3C is roughly the median,
and 2–4.5C corresponds to a 66% confidence interval.
Nevertheless, the question of whether the temperature
increase caused by a doubling in CO2 levels is only 2C, or
whether we must be prepared for 4.5C, significantly chan-
ges the emission reduction target, and how to handle the final
uncertainties in setting targets is a major problem. As for the
uncertainties of carbon cycle feedback, we examined the
influence exerted by the path of CO2 emissions, changing the
values of the parameters of feedback in Eq. 3 with reference
to IPCC (2007a, Table 7.4) as mentioned in the previous
section. Figure 3 shows the results when the target temper-
ature increase is set at 2C above the pre-industrial period
and equilibrium climate sensitivity is set at 3C. In Fig. 3, (1)
is a calculation where the effects of feedback from terrestrial
vegetation and climate feedback are not taken into account
(bL = 0, cL + cO = 0); (2) is a calculation using the median
values bL = 0.6 GtCGtC-1 and cL + cO = -96 GtCC-1;
(3) is a calculation where feedback from terrestrial vegeta-
tion only is taken into account (bL = 0.6 GtCGtC-1 and
cL + cO = 0); and (4) is a calculation using the HadCM3LC
parameter values with the strongest positive feedback among
the 11 C4MIP models (bL = 0.6 GtCGtC-1 and cL +
cO = -199 GtCC-1). The CO2 emission path gets smaller
in the order (3) [ (2) [ (1) [ (4).
In these calculations, the concentration of atmospheric
CO2 is, at most, 450 ppm and the change in temperature is
2C or less, explaining why the difference in permissible
emissions stays at about 10–20%. However, this range is
the result when climate sensitivity is fixed at 3C. When
seeking to determine permissible emissions while taking
into account the uncertainty of climate sensitivity when the
objective is to stabilize the concentration of atmospheric
CO2, a larger variation arises from climate—carbon
cycling feedback. There is only one major drop in the
profile of the paths of CO2 emissions, especially by 2030,
due mainly to the current large energy-saving potential
coupled with relatively cheap emission reduction costs in
Fig. 1 Impact of a 50% reduction in emission of greenhouse gases
(GHG) by the year 2050 on temperature change in the twenty-first
century; details of cases are summarized in Table 2
Table 1 Effects of a 50% reduction in emission of greenhouse gases




BaU, climate sensitivity 3C
Case 2 2.8
50% reduction of 1990 emission levels after
year 2050, climate sensitivity 3C
Case 3 2.0
Continuation of case 2 emission reduction
speed until year 2100, thereafter 25% of year
1990 emission maintained
Case 4 1.9
Same as case 2 except climate sensitivity is 2C
Case 5 4.2
Same as case 2 except climate sensitivity is
4.5C
Using same socio-economic assumptions as SRES B2. Compliance
with Kyoto target in year 2010 is assumed, and reduction will start
after year 2010. Controlled gases are those denoted in Kyoto Protocol
BaU Business as usual
a Temperature increase in year 2200 above pre-industrial period
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developed countries. We cannot expect this rapid decrease
in global emissions to continue after 2030. Emissions
increase slightly from around 2040–2060, to fall again as a
result of economic rationality factored into the model,
which causes a drastic change in the energy mix during this
period as shown in Fig. 4. A gradual increase in CO2
emissions after 2100 appears with a time lag of several
decades due to the effect of reduced emissions of long-
lived GHGs such as chlorofluorocarbons during the twen-
tieth and twenty-first centuries.
Bearing these factors in mind, this article examines the
validity of the emission reduction targets by (1) stochasti-
cally expressing emission reductions by 2050, and their
effects on suppressing temperature increase over the long
term, focusing on the uncertainties at stage (c) indicated
above; and (2) comparing these effects with the proposed
values for the upper limit of increased temperature. Com-
pared with climate sensitivity, little information is
available about the uncertainties involved in carbon cycling
feedback; therefore, taking into account that, even when
bL = 0 and cL + cO = 0, there is no significant difference
from emissions with a median value, this paper bases its
calculations only on bL = 0 and cL + cO = 0. Figure 5
shows the results for (1). Using the AIM/Impact (Policy)
model mentioned above, this shows emissions trajectories
with the value for temperature increase above pre-indus-
trial levels up to 2200 below a fixed value with a certain
nonexceedance probability (shown on the horizontal axis).
The necessary rate of reduction by 2050 calculated from
the trajectory is shown on the vertical axis, with 1990 as
the baseline. The rate of reduction in this figure is the rate
of reduction of the six gases specified in the Kyoto
Protocol, and the uncertainties (b) concerning climate
sensitivity are expressed by the probability function indi-
cated by the thick line in Fig. 2. Therefore, in order to keep
the temperature increase to 2C or less with a nonexcee-
dance probability of 90% or more, it will be necessary to
make reductions of 80% or more by 2050. With a nonex-
ceedance probability of 50% or more, the reduction rate is
60% or more, and with a nonexceedance probability of
10% or more, emissions must be kept below 1990 levels.
As an extension of (2), Table 2 shows the nonexceedance
probability corresponding to the proposed values for upper
limits of temperature increase based on this figure. The
upper limits for comparison are 2.6 and 3.6C above pre-
industrial times, corresponding to 2 and 3C above the
present, and 2C above pre-industrial times as consistently
advocated by the EU. Table 2 shows that, to tolerate 2C
(at which broad changes begin to occur in ecosystems) with
a nonexceedance probability of 33–66% or more, reduc-
tions of 40–80% compared to 1990 are necessary and, in
order to achieve a nonexceedance probability of 66% or
more for 2–3C above the current level cited by the IPCC,
reductions of 53% or more are called for. In other words, a
50% reduction by 2050, with a baseline of 1990, can be
interpreted as a rate of reduction at which temperature rise
Fig. 2 Probability of climate sensitivity, added to Box 10.2, Fig. 2 of
IPCC (2007a)
Fig. 3 Impact of carbon cycle feedback on CO2 emission paths
Fig. 4 Energy supply share of 2C target case
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can likely be kept to less than 2–3C above the current
level (‘‘likely’’ is the expression used in the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report). However, dependence on the nonex-
ceedance probability of the required rate of reduction is
extremely high, and the possibility that these values may
change significantly with future advances in science must
be borne in mind.
Japan’s emission reduction target
So far we have discussed a target of reducing worldwide
emissions by half. But how are these reductions to be
allocated to each country? This problem is referred to as
‘‘burden sharing,’’ and it is the subject of intense debate
from the standpoints of equity, responsibility for emissions,
reduction capability and so on (e.g., IPCC 2007c). In
stressing the importance of equity, there have been pro-
posals for allotting emissions per capita so that the value is
the same irrespective of the individual’s country or region
(Meyer 2000). In that case, the permitted emissions for
each country after attainment of the allotted targets will be
worldwide emissions multiplied by the ratio of population
(national population/world population). However, there are
many problems with the per-capita method; for example,
countries with growing populations have an advantage, and
there is no direct incentive to improve energy efficiency. In
complete opposition to this approach are allocation indexes
based on emission intensity and the concept of improve-
ment velocity, which takes the (GHG emissions/GDP) ratio
of each country in the target year (2050) as an index. These
may become common values for all countries.
Table 3 shows the necessary rates of reduction, calcu-
lated using these methods, for Japan and the other main
countries and regions of the world. For Japan, with the
equal per-capita emissions method the rate of reduction is
85% with a 1990 baseline; with the equal emission inten-
sity method it is 35%, and with the equal velocity of
emission intensity reduction method it is 91%. The emis-
sion intensity method depends heavily on estimates of the
GDP of each country in 2050. This paper uses a SRES
scenario and nine types of estimate for GDP made by a
number of agencies thereafter; 35% and 91% are the
respective median values for Japan, with ranges (in
parentheses) of -23 to 44% and 87 to 93%. For other
countries, according to the per-capita emissions method the
rate of reduction is 89% for America, 74% for Western
Europe, 34% for China, -97% (i.e., a 97% increase) for
India, 87% for all countries in Annex B, and -2% for other
countries. There are conspicuous differences between the
values for developed countries and for developing coun-
tries. On the other hand, with equal emission intensity the
differences are not so big, with Annex B countries at 63%
and other countries at 35%. With either method, the vari-
ation in the rate of reduction differs for each country and
region, but can be roughly divided into six groups (Fig. 6).
These are: (1) CIS and Eastern Europe with an 80% rate of
reduction regardless of the method used, (2) Western
Europe, North America, etc., with a lower rate under equal
emission intensity but still a 40% or higher rate of reduc-
tion, (3) Japan and Korea, with a 40% or lower rate under
equal emission intensity and 75% or more with equal per-
capita emissions, (4) China and the Middle East with a rate
of about 30% regardless of the method used, (5) Central
and South America with an equal per-capita emissions rate
of 20% or less, but a rate 10% higher with equal emission
intensity, and (6) India, Africa, etc., which can increase
emissions under equal per-capita emissions.
Fig. 5 Relation between probability of temperature target compli-
ance and emission reduction rate in the year 2050
Table 2 Probability of temperature target compliance and emission
reduction rate in the year 2050
Temperature target (C)a Probability of compliance
10% 33% 50% 66% 90%
2.0b 0 40 60 78 86
-4 43 64 87 97
2.6 -56 10 32 53 85
-64 8 34 56 95
3.6 -85 -54 -13 16 55
-79 -63 -21 15 59
a Temperature targets are increases above pre-industrial period and
reduction rates are based on 1990 emissions
b Upper row corresponds to six gases in Kyoto Protocol, lower row is
CO2
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Table 3 shows the results of calculations based on a
simple allocation index, which envisions the smoothing of
unfair burdens in reductions by 2050 or before. The sig-
nificant feature of these estimates is that whatever the
country or region of the world, whether current emissions
are heavy or light, they impose common permissible
emissions either per capita or per unit of economic activity.
While this approach is simple and, to an extent, persuasive,
it has significant problems from the standpoints of eco-
nomic efficiency and ethics. Furthermore, some countries
do not meet permissible emissions levels because it is
likely that significant unfairness will arise concerning the
cost of reduction. At present, many amendments are being
proposed to ameliorate these problems, and will have to be
taken into consideration in applying this method in future.
Design for a low-carbon society
Table 3 shows 35% and 85% (1990 baseline) as the rates of
reduction by 2050 for Japan according to the equal emis-
sion intensity and equal per capita methods, respectively.
This section examines the possibility of achieving a low-
carbon society in Japan with reference to these rates. As a
working index, and taking as a reference studies in Europe
and elsewhere, a 70% reduction was set as a median value
between 35 and 85%.
A reduction of 70% is by no means a simple objective to
attain. The speed of transformation of social systems and
energy systems must be increased several times over. To
put this in perspective, we will look at some examples of
reductions in CO2 emissions. A 70% reduction with a 1990
baseline is equivalent to a 73% reduction with a 2000
baseline. Thus, to achieve such as reduction in 50 years
requires a speed of reduction of 1-(1 - 0.73)1/50 = 2.6%/
year or more. We will call this speed of reduction
Table 3 Reduction rates by
country for world 50% emission
reductions in the year 2050.
Based on projections of GDP in
2050. We used six SRES
scenarios of AIM (Hijioka et al.
2005), A2r scenario (Grubler
et al. 2007), Wilson and
Purushothaman (2003), and
Poncet (2006)






based on 1990 (%)
Reduction ratio
based on 1990 (%)
Reduction ratio
based on 1990 (%)
United States 207 89 49 (2–63) 85 (75–88)
Canada 22 87 61 (33–65) 87 (77–89)
Japan 53 85 35 (-23 to 44) 91 (87–93)
Australia 14 89 66 (44–73) 80 (65–83)
New Zealand 3 89 70 (51–75) 83 (70–87)
Western Europe 343 74 50 (37–62) 88 (87–92)
Eastern Europe 49 87 83 (75–92) 72 (64–82)
Russia 55 94 91 (75–94) 69 (60–77)
Other CIS 72 89 90 (87–93) 59 (49–67)
South Korea 22 75 36 (-104 to 75) 68 (62–78)
China 728 34 29 (-69 to 46) -1 (-46 to 12)
India 852 -97 48 (-168 to 66) -36 (-57 to 2)
Other Asia 644 -45 8 (-27 to 49) -8 (-15 to 22)
Mexico 68 52 19 (-13 to 59) 57 (44–60)
Brazil 130 37 5 (-23 to 80) 40 (33–49)
Other Latin America 197 29 12 (-12 to 71) 40 (38–44)
Middle East 232 35 34 (20–84) 26 (22–48)
Africa 1,028 -68 51 (17–92) -18 (-49 to 37)
World 4,719 50 50 (50–50) 50 (50–50)
Annex B 705 87 63 (37–67) 82 (78–84)
Non-annex B 4,014 -2 35 (29–66) 12 (9–16)
Fig. 6 Relation of reduction rates between different sharing schemes
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a (\-2.6%, with increase as a positive value). The value a
can be shown as the sum of the rate of change in the
effectiveness of reducing carbon intensity through carbon
capture and storage (CO2 emissions/CO2 production) (b),
the rate of change in carbon intensity (CO2 production/
primary energy) (c), the rate of change in energy intensity
(primary energy/activity) (d), the rate of change in activity
per capita (e), the population rate of change (f), and con-
founding factor (g). As a mathematical equation, this
identity is written as follows:
a ¼ b þ c þ d þ e þ f þ g ð4Þ
Taking GDP as the index of activity, if the GDP growth
rate per capita in the 50 years to 2050 is 1–2% (=e), and the
rate of population change is -0.5% per year (=f) then,
based on the relationship described above, with
-2.6 [ b + c + d + 1–2 -0.5 + g, and g = 0, the
result is b + c + d \ -4.1 to -3.1 (%/year). However,
Japan’s record for the last 40 years and for the last 10 years
has been about -1%/year. To put this another way, in
addition to the earlier pace of reduction, it is necessary to
accelerate the pace of reduction by a further *2–3%/year.
Figure 7 shows both Japan’s low-carbon scenario
described below and examples of various European
countries mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and it
indicates that c + d + e + f = 3%/year or more, plus
about *0.5–1%/year through the introduction of carbon
capture and storage, is required.
If the effects of implementing carbon capture and stor-
age are excluded, improvement in carbon intensity (c)
depends on how far it is possible to replace energy with
low-carbon sources. This is a question of how quickly
technological innovation in new energy options, and
replacement infrastructures to supply them, can progress.
As can be seen from Fig. 7, this is about 1%/year. Thus, a
significant issue is whether there is scope for accelerating
the improvement velocity (d) of energy intensity. The
definition of energy intensity used above is (primary
energy/GDP), but this is a product of (energy services/
GDP) and (primary energy/energy services). The first term
is concerned exclusively with the efficiency of energy
services, while the second term is concerned with the
efficiency of energy technology (facilities and equipment).
The former depends on transformations in industrial
structure, land use and urban structure, and lifestyle, while
the latter depends on the development and adoption of
energy conservation technologies. Thus, in order to achieve
sweeping reductions, it is necessary to improve the effi-
ciency of energy services as far as possible, including a
wide range of social reforms. A plan must be designed that
can achieve intensity reductions of 2–3%/year in total
(efficiency improvements of 3- to 5-fold in 50 years) with
the development and adoption of energy-saving technolo-
gies to cover deficiencies.
As a signpost for different social trends, and with the
goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 70% by 2050 com-
pared to 1990, we designed two social scenarios (‘‘2050
Japan Low-Carbon Society’’ Scenario Team 2007). For
this task we first used a multi-sector computable general
equilibrium model, quantitatively depicting a social and
economic macroframe that takes into account changes in
envisioned social trends, demand and supply of goods and
services, advances in production technology, final
demand, trade structure and so on. Next, with an
Fig. 7 Improvement velocity
for realizing a low-carbon
society (from 2000 to 2050)
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engineering bottom-up model, we calculated the energy
services, the amount of energy, and the stock of equip-
ment and facilities required to maintain these social and
economic systems. We based the outlook for technologi-
cal progress on information taken from various future
technological scenarios and hearings with experts. Table 4
is an outline of the social and economic indicators, energy
consumption and CO2 emissions in these two scenarios.
Scenario A is a technocentric and urban-centered scenario
(nicknamed ‘‘Doraemon’’), while Scenario B is a slower,
more ecocentric scenario (nicknamed ‘‘Satsuki and Mei’’).
In both scenarios, reductions of 70% are achieved, but the
specific means of reduction differ for each. As shown in
Table 4, the average economic growth rate in Scenario A
is 1.5% per year, higher than the 0.6% for Scenario B.
The amount of energy services, such as energy-intensive
goods production and freight transport, is affected by the
trend toward dematerialization and hence does not change
as much as the GDP, although in Scenario A the amount
of energy services increases (whereas it decreases in
Scenario B). In both scenarios, there is an active move-
ment toward a highly energy-efficient urban structure and
low-carbon energy, with widespread adoption of energy-
saving equipment, but Scenario A involves faster tech-
nological innovation and adoption, whereas Scenario B is
designed to depend on carbon intensity improvements
through a switch to biomass. In order to achieve the
emissions target, Scenario A envisions the capture and
storage of carbon dioxide (CCS) emitted in thermal power
generation and in the production of hydrogen.
In Fig. 7, energy intensity is expressed as a single item.
However, if items related to energy service efficiency and
to technology are calculated separately, the results for
energy service efficiency and technology efficiency in
Scenario A is 1.4%/year and 0.9%/year, respectively, while
in Scenario B they are 0.8%/year and 1.1%/year. It is clear
that both scenarios depend on social and structural trans-
formations such as changes in industrial structure, land use
and urban structure, and lifestyle, resulting in improve-
ments in energy service efficiency of about 1%/year.
Table 4 Seventy percent
reduction societies in the year
2050 (percentages compared
with the year 2000 in
parenthesis)
Indicator Unit 2000 2050
Scenario A Scenario B
Population Million 127 94 (74%) 100 (79%)
Households Million 47 43 (92%) 42 (90%)
Number of average households Person 2.7 2.2 2.4
GDP Trillion yen 519 1,080 (208%) 701 (135%)
Share of gross domestic product
Primary industry % 2% 1% 2%
Secondary industry % 28% 18% 20%
Tertiary industries % 71% 80% 79%
Floor space of business office Million m2 1,654 1,934 (117%) 1,718 (104%)
Passenger transportation volume Billion passenger km 1,297 1,045 (81%) 963 (74%)
Private car % 53% 32% 51%
Public transportation % 34% 52% 38%
On foot/bicycle % 7% 7% 8%
Volume of freight transportation Billion tonne km 570 608 (107%) 490 (86%)
Industrial production indicator 100 126 (126%) 90 (90%)
Iron and steel production Million tonne 107 67 (63%) 58 (54%)
Ethylene production Million tonne 8 5 (60%) 3 (40%)
Cement production Million tonne 82 51 (62%) 47 (57%)
Paper production Million tonne 32 18 (57%) 26 (81%)
CO2 emission Million tonne
Generation 311.5 127.7 (41%) 85.2 (27%)
Carbon capture and storage 42.4 0.0
Emission (compared with 1990) 311.5 85.3 (27%) 85.2 (27%)
Energy MTOE -30% -30%
Primary 523.5 334.1 (64%) 264.0 (50%)
Final consumption 380.2 225.8 (59%) 209.3 (55%)
Fossil energy dependency ratio 80.0% 59.8% 51.0%
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Whatever the scenario, serious and systematic
initiatives must be started immediately
The analysis above shows that making a sweeping reduc-
tion of 70% in Japan’s emissions by 2050 is impossible
through technological improvements alone. Nonetheless,
the direct costs required, calculated at about ¥10 trillion per
year (‘‘2050 Japan Low-Carbon Society’’ Scenario Team
2007), are not beyond the bounds of economic possibility.
However, in order to undertake serious initiatives
toward a low-carbon society, in addition to the social and
energy visions depicted in Scenarios A and B, it is neces-
sary to draw up a roadmap for achieving this society. While
we must make adaptive improvements to this vision in
response to relevant scientific developments and advances
in technology, we must also take the following initiatives
promptly and systematically:
1. Structural changes in industry, land, and cities; infra-
structure upgrades and development; investment,
adoption and use of energy conservation and low-
carbon energy technologies
2. Economic and systemic measures in support of these
transformations
Since this is a long-term issue, there is a tendency to view it
as non-urgent, but the longer the actions are delayed, the
lower the possibility of solving the problem. A coordinated
response is necessary across all sectors of society under
strong leadership, based on a firm recognition of the
necessity of establishing a low-carbon society. In order to
achieve this, more research of the kind presented in this
paper is required.
Acknowledgments This research was supported by the Global
Environment Research Fund of the Ministry of Environment, Japan,
S-3-1.
References
‘‘2050 Japan Low-Carbon Society’’ Scenario Team (2007) Japan
scenarios toward low-carbon society (LCS): feasibility study for
70% CO2 emission reduction by 2050 below 1990 level. Japan-UK
joint research project, developing visions for a low-carbon society
(LCS) through sustainable development, http://2050.nies.go.jp/
interimreport/20070215_report_e.pdf
Friedlingstein P, Dufresne J-L, Cox PM, Rayner P (2003) How
positive is the feedback between climate change and the carbon
cycle? Tellus B 55(2):692–700
Grubler A, O’Neill B, Riahi K, Chirkov V, Goujon A, Kolp P,
Prommer I, Scherbov S, Slentoe E (2007) Regional, national, and
spatially explicit scenarios of demographic and economic change
based on SRES. Technol Forecast Soc Change 74:980–1029
Hijioka Y, Masui T, Takahashi K, Matsuoka Y, Harasawa H (2005)
Development of a support tool for greenhouse gas emissions
control policy to help mitigate the impact of global warming.
Environ Econ Policy Stud 7(3):331–346
IPCC (2007a) Climate change 2007: the physical science basis. In:
Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB,
Tignor M, Miller HL (eds) Contribution of working group I to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the intergovernmental panel on
climate change. Cambridge University Press, New York
IPCC (2007b) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulner-
ability. Working group II contribution to the intergovernmental
panel on climate change, Fourth Assessment Report, Summary for
policymakers, http://www.gtp89.dial.pipex.com/chpt.htm
IPCC (2007c) Climate change 2007: mitigation. In: Metz B, Davidson
OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA (eds) Contribution of
working group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York
Maier-Reimer E, Hasselmann K (1987) Transport and storage of CO2
in the ocean—an inorganic ocean-circulation carbon cycle
model. Clim Dyn 2(2):63–90
Meyer A (2000) Contraction and convergence, the global solution to
climate change. Schumacher Society, Green Books, Totnes, UK
Poncet S (2006) The long term growth prospects of the world
economy: Horizon 2050, No.2006–16. CEPII, Paris
Schellnhuber HJ, Cramer W, Nakicenovic N, Wigley TML, Yohe G
(eds) (2006) Avoiding dangerous climate change. Cambridge
University Press, New York
Wilson D, Purushothaman R (2003) Dreaming with BRICs: the path
to 2050, global economics paper, No. 99. Goldman Sachs Global
Research Centre
Sustain Sci (2008) 3:135–143 143
123
